Anu Bradford, jurist: ‘The biggest tariff of all is the uncertainty’

The thing that most concerns Finnish-American academic Anu Bradford is the current U.S. effort to impose its model on Europe.

The professor of Law and International Organizations at Columbia University – who was born in Tampere, Finland, in 1975 – is best-known for publishing The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (2020), in which she argued that the EU has the capacity to create a regulatory framework for the world. Five years later, Bradford is imploring the EU not to give in to pressure from the U.S., nor to domestic pressure, which has also increased.

EL PAÍS caught up with Bradford as she was in the process of moving into a smaller apartment. There were some boxes at the entrance of her grand five-bedroom duplex overlooking Central Park, where she currently lives with her three children and her husband, fellow academic Travis Bradford, who is as friendly and helpful as she is.

We spoke about Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technology (2023), where she explains that the new global geopolitical battle goes hand in hand with the struggle for control of technology.

Question. Do you think there’s a strategy behind Trump’s constant tariff changes, or is he acting on childish impulses?

Answer. I don’t think [there’s a strategy]. Trade wars have no winners. There’s no way we can make America a manufacturing superpower. The U.S. cannot do what China does. It’s prohibitively costly for U.S. companies. It’s expensive for U.S. consumers and U.S. businesses that rely on inputs and raw materials from abroad. So, it makes no economic sense whatsoever. What I also think is very upsetting is that he’s targeting adversaries and allies alike: Canada, Mexico, the EU... He is breaking important American alliances and eroding the trust on which important political and economic relationships are based. And, to me, the biggest tariff of all is the uncertainty.

Q: What role do big tech companies play in Trump’s policies?

A. Mark Zuckerberg doesn’t wake up in the morning thinking, “What can I do for democracy today?” I don’t think the tech companies are all evil: I think they have so much power that they can no longer responsibly handle it. It’s not that they want to destroy our societies, but ultimately, they don’t care enough to put up guardrails that will prevent that from happening. And they’re profit-driven, which isn’t the same as [responding to the] public interest.

I worry about the outsized influence of tech companies, unconstrained when we don’t have vigilant governments. And that’s why I’m so worried about the Trump administration: this administration isn’t acting in the public interest. When the U.S. isn’t part of the conversation, it’s much harder to have real kinds of global frameworks.

Q. You coined the phrase “the Brussels effect.” With Trump, is it still powerful?

A. There’s much more geopolitical conflict [today], and the shortcomings of European power have become more evident. I would say there’s an external and internal threat to the Brussels effect. The external threat is that, right now, the Trump administration is very forcefully pushing back against EU regulations. And it’s teaming up with the leading tech companies to basically say that, “look, the European digital laws are protectionist against American companies and the Europeans need to walk them back.”

It’s critical that Europeans don’t give in; if they start making concessions, the extortionists will only return with greater force: [the EU will] be asked to leave Google alone, then Meta, then X… and then, to abandon the AI regulation law. There’s also an internal threat: Europeans themselves are beginning to question their regulatory system.

Q. Perhaps because of the false belief that regulation limits innovation…

A. Europeans are now, I think, very painfully aware that they’re too dependent on Chinese and American technologies. There’s this idea that we no longer live in a world where we can just worry about digital rights and democracy: we also need to have capabilities. And this is a very fertile political environment for the anti-regulation forces in Europe to seize the momentum and say, “We cannot regulate, this is just holding us back.” And I’ve pushed back against this narrative, because [while] I share the concern that the Europeans are behind the Americans in technological innovation, giving up on digital rights is not what gets Europe there.

Q. What can be done to accelerate technological development in Europe?

A. We need to integrate the digital single market. Right now, tech companies [struggle to] scale across the vast European market. They face different regulatory barriers in different markets. We [also] need capital markets. We have very strict bankruptcy laws in Europe and cultural attitudes that make failure very costly. So, European tech entrepreneurs cannot pursue disruptive innovations, because sometimes, those innovations fail. And, if they go through bankruptcy in Europe, they’re done. They never raise money again.

Another thing I’d emphasize is that the Europeans really need to do better at attracting global talent. This is the big difference: Americans have been so much better at attracting immigrants.

Q. But that was before the current Trump immigration policy was approved.

A. I think that the Europeans should take advantage of this and roll out the red carpet and tell all those AI scientists, data scientists [and] tech entrepreneurs, “Europe welcomes you. Why don’t you come to Europe and innovate?” Because many of them don’t feel welcome in the U.S. anymore.

Q. The tension on the Finnish-Russian border shows that Europe’s security cannot continue to depend on the U.S.

A. One of the worst moments of the Trump administration was his meeting with Zelenskiy. That’s why Europe’s defense cannot continue to depend on the U.S. Trump has made it clear that if something were to happen on the Finnish-Russian border, it wouldn’t be his war. And such an invasion would mean the end of the EU. Europe should have started building its own defenses 20 years ago. It needs to change radically and be more ambitious; there are no more excuses.

Q. But it’s difficult for Europe to find ethical and reliable allies.

A. It doesn’t have many alternatives. China, the U.S. and Israel are unethical, unreliable, or politically risky options. [Perhaps the EU can look to] Japan and South Korea. The important thing is to find other suppliers while moving toward self-sufficiency. Europe can’t be on tenterhooks every four years, watching how its future is shaped by whoever wins the U.S. presidential election.

Q. You warn that the technological war isn’t only economic in nature, but also ideological. Ideally, the European model would be followed in order to save democracy… but the trend is moving toward the Chinese authoritarian model, or the market-based American one.

A. China is gaining more and more influence. We have more and more countries that are looking to China as an example and pursuing this kind of digital authoritarian model. In many ways, China has been tremendously successful in exporting its model. It provides a path to digital development, especially across Latin America [and] Africa. It’s providing the infrastructures that countries can afford. So, you can’t really blame these countries for wanting to have access to digital networks that China is building for them.

Q. This is what the Chinese government has called the Digital Silk Road Initiative.

A. China is building these smart, secure cities, installing surveillance cameras and infrastructure. Europeans and Americans are unable to offer an alternative. And I’m going to make a statement that, out of context, might sound wrong: China has shown the world that freedom isn’t necessary for innovation. They’re promoting a technological economy without being a free society.

Q. The U.S. is starting to follow that model.

A. The U.S. is moving toward authoritarianism, which is absolutely alarming. I think this just shows the kind of the appeal of the Chinese model, not just in authoritarian countries, but also in democracies.

Q. But how can we stop someone like Trump, who’s immoral and irrational?

A. We still have independent courts, unlike in China. [But] Trump has a friendly Supreme Court, so I’m not 100% convinced that I can trust the courts to push back. We also need civil society. We need the independent press. We need scholars. We need all segments of society to defend fundamental freedoms in this country. And the question is how robust that resistance will be.

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